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What options are available for Hong Kong directors seeking transnational success? Such 
directors could content themselves with localized production aimed at the domestic market, the 
reliable but modest pan-Asian territories, and the overseas diaspora. They could try to penetrate 
the fast-growing PRC market by mounting Hong Kong-China coproductions. They might try to 
forge strategic partnerships with other Asian countries, as Soi Cheang did by courting Japanese 
investors to co-finance Manga adaptation Shamo (2008). Sourcing European investors, as 
Johnnie To did with Vengeance (2009), provides another option. Or the Hong Kong director 
could venture to Hollywood, a path chosen by several of the region’s foremost directors in the 
1990s. Peter Ho-Sun Chan – a Hong Kong producer-director renowned for launching 
transnational initiatives – has during his career pursued several of these production pathways. 
Encouraged by the 2003 CEPA trade agreement [1], Chan and other Hong Kong directors have 
in recent years intensified their commitment to PRC production. At the same time, edicts handed 
down from Beijing encourage the production of Chinese-produced blockbusters that attain global 
success. “In China there is a national incentive that all industries must expand internationally,” 
states distributor Jeffrey Chan. “The PRC government issued a statement that Chinese films 
should go international.” [2] Industry executives in Hong Kong and China frequently take Ang 
Lee’s global hit Crouching Tiger, Hidden Dragon (2000) as the benchmark for this kind of 
transnational enterprise.  
 
Notwithstanding Crouching Tiger’s crossover success, many critics and industry personnel – on 
both hemispheres – contend that Chinese storytelling is intrinsically different from Western 
storytelling, hence Chinese crossover movies represent an inevitably rare species of film. (These 
commentators often point out that Crouching Tiger was written by an American screenwriter, 
James Schamus.) Compounding this perspective is the commercial failure of transnational 
ventures such as Zhang Yimou’s The Flowers of War (2011) in the West. The axiom seems to 
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be: If Chinese films are to succeed in the West, Chinese filmmakers must change the way they 
tell their stories. In this chapter I suggest that this contention – widespread though it is – 
generates an Orientalist fallacy, and moreover, that a Chinese film’s international success relies 
as much on adroit distribution and marketing as on universal storytelling devices. I focus on the 
latter-day career of Peter Chan, whose recent films have brought him into close proximity with 
this essentialist storytelling fallacy in both Asia and America. 
 
The PRC’s rapid industrial and market growth creates increased opportunity, which Hong Kong 
directors are culturally and geographically well-placed to exploit. Nevertheless, the Hong Kong 
director venturing north abnegates a degree of artistic freedom to Beijing censors. As is well 
known, China’s state censors monitor both preproduction (all mainland productions are subject 
to script approval) and postproduction (the full cut of the film is submitted to The State 
Administration of Radio, Film and Television [SARFT] for final distribution approval). No such 
restrictions apply in Hong Kong, where full-fledged scripts often coalesce only at the end of 
shooting. In addition, the typical Hong Kong director’s genre specialisms – martial-arts action, 
heroic bloodshed, supernatural thrillers, and comedies – run counter to SARFT rules forbidding 
the depiction of ghosts, sympathetic criminals, and extreme violence and sex. Then there are the 
intricate geopolitical taboos. Any film put forward for mainland distribution – whether produced 
in the PRC or imported from overseas – is vetted for potential offence given to China’s allies. 
Also to be avoided is sensitive socio-historical subject matter. Hong Kong comedy Running on 
Karma, signed by Johnnie To and Wai Ka-fai in 2003, ran afoul of Beijing censors for depicting 
a Chinese protagonist (Cecilia Cheung) reincarnated from a Japanese soldier. Such a premise, 
though overtly comedic, offends a Chinese government to whom Sino-Japanese relations remain 
fractious. According to the film’s co-writer Au Kin-yee, SARFT – ever vigilant against 
superstition – also objected to the male hero’s preternatural ability to perceive the past lives of 
others. Consequently, the Milkyway Image creative team excised the male hero’s extrasensory 
“visions” from the mainland release, resulting in nonsensical stretches of action. “The movie was 
released in China,” says Au, “but it received very bad reviews because of all the changes we 
were forced to make – the mainland critics couldn’t understand what was going on in the movie 
because, without the hero’s visions, the story no longer made sense.” [3] By contrast, the 
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unedited version of Running on Karma distributed in other Asian territories garnered admiring 
reviews and numerous prizes. In all, PRC censorship presents a significant obstacle to all films 
submitted for mainland distribution. 
 
Faced with such strictures, Hong Kong directors rely on ingenuity, guilefulness, and duplicity to 
attain coproduction approval. Some filmmakers resort to stealth tactics, furnishing SARFT’s 
script censors with bogus screenplays. In the early 2000s, as Milkyway’s staff writers toiled on 
other projects, freelancers hired by the studio churned out insipid SARFT-friendly scripts 
bearing only facile resemblance to the de facto shooting script. The phony screenplay, its 
purpose in acquiring SARFT authorization fulfilled, gave way during production to the practice 
of devising scenes per diem, as customary in Hong Kong filmmaking. Milkyway abandoned this 
stratagem as script censors grew more vigilant, but it remains a practical expedient for some 
joint-venture studios. Once censored by SARFT, the “script” becomes less an ironclad mandate 
for filming than a blueprint identifying political taboos. A few filmmakers, recognizing that 
script censorship and postproduction censorship constitute distinct processes, deviate from the 
sanctioned script during shooting so as to accommodate new ideas and practical exigencies. In 
this context, creativity can still flourish beyond the script-censorship stage, the filmmaker aware 
that script approval is but the first hurdle in an all-encompassing censorship process. Some 
directors, such as Peter Chan, quietly defy the censors and shoot the expurgated passages of the 
script. “Time and again,” says Chan, “I find that things censored at the script-approval stage pass 
the censors at the postproduction censorship stage. On paper the censored element is a no-no, but 
when the censors watch the finished film and are emotionally touched by it, they allow us to 
keep the censored element in the film.” [4] The final censorship stage – approving the completed 
cut for theatrical release – can lead to wrangling between filmmaker and state censors, at worst 
culminating in stalemate; the film may never find release. But the shrewd director navigates this 
phase by means of trade-offs and compromise. A panel of SARFT censors, having viewed the 
director’s cut, provides the director instructions for revisions. “They may tell you to change eight 
things,” Chan points out. “You can’t fight them on all eight points. Instead, five or six of those 
things you must learn to live without, so that you can fight for the two or three things that you 




So much jockeying is onerous but necessary for Hong Kong directors who see working with or 
within China worthwhile. Once immersed in state-governed filmmaking, she or he learns that 
SARFT censors – apparently all-powerful and absolute – occupy a mere tier in the government 
hierarchy. “SARFT is not the deciding party, they are the mediator,” remarks Chan. “Nobody 
knows who actually calls the shots.” Though the state censorship system is opaque, it is not 
intransigent. Some SARFT proscriptions are flexible, others mercurial, and the Hong Kong 
director must divine the epoch’s limits of permissibility. Officially thorny subjects, such as 
China’s one-child-per-family policy and child trafficking, may unexpectedly be granted approval 
by SARFT’s script censors, as in the case of Chan’s Dearest (2014). In short, some Hong Kong 
directors – particularly those already possessing experience and esteem – consider SARFT a 
negotiable obstacle. Though artistic compromise is inevitable, bargaining power may be wielded, 
and SARFT censors may acquiesce on certain points of contention. At any rate, directors believe 
that the mainland market will repay their efforts. Not only financially (though the vast market 
potential of the PRC is certainly a prime attraction), but culturally, too, the mainland pathway 
holds advantages. According to Chan, the “serious” film director – more so than top-flight 
matinee idols – is venerated both by the mainland critical firmament and by the market itself, 
whose passionate film culture accords auteurs a level of reverence and loyalty rare in Hong 
Kong. Moreover, the PRC market is not only populous but eclectic: mass tastes demand a 
diversity of film product. Hence the Hong Kong director can indulge pluralistic impulses stifled 
by the action-centered Cantonese cinema. Beijing censorship may close down artistic expression, 
but the creative opportunity to go beyond action-genre filmmaking represents, for directors like 
Chan, a kind of freedom seldom possible within the Hong Kong mainstream. 
 
Going North: American Dreams in China (2013) 
For Hong Kong directors, then, the China production route proves to be double-edged. Beijing 
curbs artistic freedom through official censorship, but the cinephilic market nourishes the Hong 
Kong filmmaker eager to diversify. Chan’s American Dreams in China provides an instance of 
the ambivalence attending the China pathway. On the one hand, Chan is obliged to exercise a 
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priori self-censorship, omitting any coverage of the Tiananmen uprising despite the film’s 
backdrop of 1980s Chinese history. “That’s the biggest red tape in China,” attests Chan. “There 
is no way, in a movie made in China, that one could even hint that there was such an incident; if 
you want to recreate the Tiananmen incident on film, then forget about making your movie in 
China.” On the other hand, Chan prospered by China’s giant theatrical market. Against a budget 
of US $9 million, American Dreams grossed US $86 million domestically; the film’s success 
boosted Chan’s renown in China; and it provided him a degree of leverage with SARFT, 
possibly accounting for the script censors’ leniency toward Dearest, Chan’s subsequent project 
about China’s child abduction crisis.  
 
American Dreams in China centers on three mainland Chinese protagonists, first introduced as 
college students in mid-1980s Beijing. Cheng Dongqing (Huang Xiaoming), Meng Xiaojun 
(Deng Chao), and Wang Yang (Tong Dawei) idolize America, and the most confident of these 
young men – Xiaojun – enrolls as an exchange student at Harvard University. Yang’s girlfriend 
Su Mei (Du Juan) also gains entry into America. Dongqing, desperate to bask in the American 
Dream, is repeatedly denied a US visa. Dejected, he takes a job teaching English language in 
China. Unexpectedly, his private classes amass a large following, and he expands his teaching 
venture into a large-scale business. Meanwhile, Xiaojun’s experiences in the US debunk the 
myth of the American Dream, and he returns disconsolately to China. Several years pass, and the 
three friends found the New Vision Institute, an English tuition enterprise that morphs into a 
global brand. When the three men are summoned to America to defend legal charges of a 
professional breach, cultural and interpersonal conflicts come to the fore.   
 
From the start, Chan conceived American Dreams to be a China-centric production. A first-draft 
screenplay by Hong Kong colleague Aubrey Lam established the broad plot outline, but Chan 
sought to Sinicize the script by recruiting mainland writers (Zhou Zhiyong and Zhang Ji) to 
infuse the story with local detail. Out of this rewrite sprang the film’s ideological fervor. 
Specifically, the finished script promotes the concept of a “Chinese dream,” a polysemous phrase 
broadly denoting a collective, nationalistic optimism that is believed to have “deeply penetrated 
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the psyche of regular [Chinese] citizens” (Burkitt 2014). [5] Gerard Lemos, in The End of the 
Chinese Dream, defines this concept as a specifically 1980s phenomenon triggered by the end of 
the Cultural Revolution and the promise of political reform under Deng Xiaoping. The Chinese 
dream, Lemos maintains, encapsulates civic hopes for security, stability, prosperity, and social 
freedoms – ideals that Lemos claims evaporated following the 1989 protests in Beijing (Lemos 
2013: 38; 57; 271). To some extent, the plot of American Dreams dramatizes this historical 
trajectory sans the Tiananmen incident, while attempting at the climax to rehabilitate the Chinese 
dream for the 2000s (much as President Xi Jinping has revived the concept in recent political 
speeches).  
 
In this context, American Dreams functions as a vehicle for PRC soft power, promoting national 
cohesion and societal harmony within China. As the British weekly The Economist reported in 
2013, “The [Chinese] government has twin ambitions in fostering the film industry, one 
domestic and one global. At home, it wants people to see films that will inculcate Chinese values 
and culture…Abroad, the government wants to spread a more attractive image of the country” 
(Anon. 2013: 101). Similarly, soft power may be principally domestic and pan-Asian – “creating 
common, imagined identities and values for Asians” (Young and Jong, 2008: 470) – and/or 
global, propagating Chinese ideology to the rest of the world and assuaging western fears of the 
so-called “China threat.” [6] American Dreams, thematized around the optimistic Chinese dream, 
harnesses domestic soft power, and as such obliges Chan to forego the international market. As 
one critic writes, “[In films like] American Dreams in China, one dimensional patriotism doesn’t 
appeal to foreigners whatsoever” (Huntsman 2014: 35). To its detractors, the film embodies state 
propaganda. Here domestic soft power – the kind of story that China tells its own citizens – is 
sharply different than global soft power, the kinds of story conceived for a transnational 
audience. For American Dreams (according to its critics) fosters not only ethnocentrism, but 
anti-western nationalism. In particular, its perceived anti-American rhetoric all but torpedoes the 
film’s prospects for North American distribution. For Chan, this means delimiting his audience 
to a single albeit very large market – a drastic shift for a producer-director renowned for 
transnational storytelling and modes of distribution. Needless to say, too, the state’s premium on 
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China-centrism and domestic soft power stymies the industry’s ability to produce crossover 
international hits like Crouching Tiger, Hidden Dragon and Hero. 
 
American Dreams in China opens with a montage sequence that, through a kind of narrational 
omniscience, deftly establishes the Chinese protagonists’ superiority over Americans. Doe-eyed 
student Dongqing, denied a US visa by an aloof American clerk, sinks into despair, but the 
sequence supplies his retrospective voiceover narration, placing us (that is, the intended Chinese 
spectator) in a privileged position of knowledge about the American clerk’s folly. The rest of the 
film will depict Dongqing’s (and his friends’) rise to success in spite of America and Americans. 
The three college friends, at first zealously pro-United States (“Our generation desires all things 
American”), trace an arc of disillusionment with the country. At college they staunchly defend 
American values, but their Chinese professor decries their callowness (“You’re still too young, 
too naïve,” he insists, citing their ignorance of American racism against ethnic minorities). 
Adamant that the US harbors indiscriminate opportunity, Xiaojun becomes a student there, later 
followed by Yang and Mei. But Xiaojun’s American dream soon fizzles: obliged to scratch a 
living washing dishes, and thwarted in his academic aspirations, he returns to China. A similar 
fate befalls Mei and Yang. Reunited in Beijing with Dongqing and Yang, Xiaojun discovers that 
Chinese citizens can achieve the American Dream not in the US but in China – or, at least, some 
variant thereof, a “New Vision” or a “Chinese dream.” Now, Xiaojun echoes his former 
professor: “I was too young and too naïve [about America],” he reflects, puncturing the illusion 
that America provides equal opportunity for all (“The playing field has never been even”). [7] At 
the climax, the protagonists castigate the American executives litigating against them. “You 
don’t understand Chinese culture…China has changed, but you’re still stuck in the past.” 
Nowadays, they say, Chinese students aspire for success in China, not America. [8] 
 
American critics object to the film’s putatively anti-American polemic, but director Chan avers 
that American Dreams reflects contemporary Chinese attitudes: “I could have made the film less 
offensive [to American viewers] but it represents exactly the mentality in China right now.” 
Nevertheless, the film’s imputed slighting of American society – a corollary to its soft power 
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rhetoric of Chinese nationalism – makes large-scale US export untenable. For some 
commentators, however, the film’s problems go deeper. A widely-shared assumption holds that 
not only ethnocentrism but cultural essentialism handicaps Chinese films in the global 
marketplace. On this view, Chinese movies such as those made by Chan (a director renowned for 
possessing a “western” outlook [9]) will inevitably falter in the west regardless of their 
ideological biases, because Chinese modes of storytelling differ radically from the storytelling 
norms of western cinema. Bizarrely, this essentialist fallacy seems to prevail both among film 
critics and within the international distribution sector. Critic Raymond Zhou, for instance, 
contends that cinematic storytelling is determined by a director’s “cultural sensibility”: “Unless a 
filmmaker is born in – or grew up with – two cultures, he or she can approach a story from only 
one cultural angle” (Zhou 2014). Within the film distribution industry, received wisdom dictates 
that only certain genres – particularly horror and action – harbor cross-cultural potential, while 
others such as comedy flounder overseas. [10] “European distributors don’t even want us to 
make love stories,” claims Chan. “Even though romance is universal, the distributors think that 
foreign audiences don’t want to watch romance films set in an unfamiliar city featuring movie 
stars they don’t know.” Accordingly, Chan’s most successful US exports are entries into the 
genres of action (The Warlords [2007]) and horror (Three…Extremes [2004]; The Eye [2002]), 
while his comedic and romance films (e.g. Golden Chicken [2002]; Perhaps Love [2005]) attract 
limited or no western distribution.    
 
Not surprisingly, wary distributors balk at “risky” narrative and genre experimentation. While 
complex “puzzle” plots flourish in many national cinemas, China’s puzzle films are mostly 
deemed unfit for western export. Foreign distributors may re-edit the Chinese import in ways 
that amplify genre elements and diminish narrative complexity. As early as the preproduction 
phase, the local filmmaker’s narrative adventurousness may be vitiated by international sales 
agents. Based on advice from distributor Celluloid Dreams, for instance, Milkyway staff writers 
retooled the opening scenes of Mad Detective (2007) for greater narrative simplicity. At the same 
time, the film’s sales agent encouraged conventional genre plotting. “We were reminded from 
the start about market demand,” says the film’s writer Au Kin-yee. “Everybody expects a 
Johnnie To film to be a genre police action movie, and so, for distribution reasons – no matter 
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how crazy we made our detective protagonist – we had to try to keep Mad Detective within the 
context of a typical police crime story.” [11] A kind of compromise meant that Mad Detective 
remains a complexly-plotted genre film, but its international distribution would be limited 
chiefly to the festival circuit and ancillary markets. The thesis I wish to advance, then, is this: the 
dearth of successful Chinese crossover films is due not to irreducible disparities between Chinese 
and Western storytelling, but (in large measure) to conservative and wrongheaded overseas 
distribution criteria. These criteria betray essentialist assumptions regarding cultural specificity 
and competency. At worst, they override authorial intention, and determine how the film’s story 
is to be told – a process which invariably nullifies adventurous plotting, whether in the case of 
distributors reworking an extant Chinese release or promoting generic storytelling during 
production.  
 
Going West: Wu Xia (2011) 
For directors like Chan, to target the North American market – much like targeting the PRC 
market – is to tolerate a kind of censorship whereby tacit essentialist principles constrain creative 
freedom. Chan’s swordplay drama Wu Xia provides a paradigm case. As a product traversing 
both the China coproduction system and the North American distribution process, Wu Xia 
testifies to the ways Chinese filmmakers must sublimate authorial expression to mercurial yet 
strongly-felt political and institutional boundaries. In preproduction the film was subject to 
SARFT script approval. Originally, Aubrey Lam’s script depicted the evil “72 Demons” cadre as 
ethnic Tanguts, but state censors flinched at the risk of inflaming peoples in the northwest – not 
least because political controversy still rages around Tibet, a region closely imbricated with 
Tangut history. “This element is still present in the finished film,” notes Chan, “but it had to be 
sort of hidden, because China is very nervous about offending different ethnic groups.” SARFT’s 
script censors also advised Chan to moderate scenes of physical violence. Aware that the film 
would face a second round of SARFT mandates upon completion, Chan shot scenes with the 
level of violence he desired. “The script censors are always telling you, ‘Reduce the amount of 
blood and gore,’ but I only take these notes seriously in postproduction editing. I shoot what I 




In postproduction, other market pressures vexed Chan’s authorial intentions. All dialogue in the 
“director’s cut” is rendered in Mandarin, but Chan prepared an alternative audio track for 
audiences in Hong Kong and Guangdong. The latter region in particular has become a key 
market priority for Chinese distributors. [12] Not only the most populous province in mainland 
China (with a population of more than 100 million people as compared to Hong Kong’s 7 million 
citizen), but also a Cantonese-speaking territory traditionally receptive to Cantonese cinema, the 
Guangdong market obliges distributors to dub Mandarin-dialect films into Cantonese. [13] 
Another stimulus for dubbing stems from the Chinese audience being most accustomed to Wu 
Xia’s leading players (Donnie Yen and Takeshi Kaneshiro) speaking Cantonese on screen. Here 
again Chan, anxious to preserve “the integrity of the film,” sought the middle ground. Hence the 
southern China version of Wu Xia renders the heroic villagers’ speech in Cantonese, and the evil 
Tanguts in Mandarin. Motivated realistically, the plot now locates its peaceful village in southern 
China; dramatic conflict erupts between North and South. This market-driven maneuver, 
however, amplifies the Manicheism of the action, diluting the moral complexity of Yen’s 
reformed Tangut barbarian, and diverting the drama from the graduated moral dimensions Chan 
professes to favor. 
 
Wu Xia would subsequently be reworked further at the behest of its North American distributor, 
the Weinstein Company (TWC). As far as US handling of Asian imports goes, the case of Wu 
Xia strikes me as fairly representative. Initially enthusiastic for the film’s commercial prospects, 
TWC pledged to release Wu Xia in American theaters in extant form. Soon, though, Harvey 
Weinstein felt compelled to simplify the film’s story. “I was told that 90% of the indigenous US 
market for foreign films is no longer the art-film crowd but ethnic teens, who want to watch 
action scenes,” says Chan. “In that sense, Wu Xia was judged too complicated for viewers of 18 
years and younger.” As a result, TWC editors devised a streamlined version of Wu Xia catering 
to an action-oriented youth demographic. Trimmed by twenty minutes but padded with 
explanatory intertitles and voiceover fragments, the film’s action-genre elements acquired 
additional salience. The TWC cut excises, shaves, re-sequences, or reverses individual frames, 
partly (in the last case) to conjure eyeline matches and smooth over elided footage; it expunges 
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the occasional music cue; and thanks to its abbreviated shots it accelerates the original film’s 
tempo, yielding an average shot length of 2.6 seconds (as against the Chinese cut’s ASL of about 
3 seconds). So much tinkering culminated, to Chan’s displeasure, in a perfunctory new title – 
Dragon. In all, the TWC cut relegates narrative complexity and dialogue-driven domestic scenes, 
throwing into bold relief scenes of physical action (chiefly kung-fu and swordplay). [14] Chan 
calls the final TWC version “compromised.” According to Chan, TWC followed this re-editing 
phase with months of internal note-gathering and market research, inducing among the TWC 
executives indecision, bureaucratic procrastination, and, finally, loss of faith in the film. “They 
lost interest and got scared,” maintains Chan. “They sent Dragon to the executives, every 
executive gave notes on this version, and this process invited criticism of the film because the 
executives are not allowed to not give notes – and eventually Harvey Weinstein didn’t know 
what to do with the movie.” Granted a limited theatrical run of three days across fourteen 
screens, Dragon grossed a meager US $11,137 at the North American box office. [15] 
 
Of course, the Weinsteins’ tampering with imports has by now become the stuff of notoriety. 
[16] Behind this practice lies an assumption that the Asian import in toto won’t “translate” to a 
western audience, hence the need for aesthetic reshaping. Partly this premise relates to the 
American audience’s cultural competency. As US distributor Doris Pfardrescher asserts, “There 
is a lot of local humor and cultural differences in Chinese films that Americans don’t 
understand.” [17] For Jeffrey Chan, CEO of Distribution Workshop, “there may be social and 
political cultural background in a Chinese film that you have to explain to the western audience, 
and this may make the film boring to western viewers.” [18] Aside from culture-specific 
knowledge, however, there persists a belief that more fundamental incongruities are at play, as 
Patrick Frater attests: “One of the things I hear from distributors worldwide is that Chinese 
storytelling is simply different and doesn’t work in the same way as western stories.” [19] This 
concern is only compounded by the Asian filmmaker’s acquiescence, however grudging, to the 




Thus far these Asian directors have adopted several strategies of damage limitation. Most typical 
is that of consent and compromise, as typified by Chan and Wu Xia. Stephen Chow’s 2001 
comedy Shaolin Soccer – whose US release was repeatedly postponed by Miramax Films, and 
from which 26 minutes was excised – also demonstrates this line of muted resistance, as does 
Zhang Yimou’s complicity in shearing twenty minutes from Hero (2002) at Miramax’s behest. 
More unusually, the director may seek control of the re-editing phase by personally assembling 
the international cut. Wong Kar-wai’s The Grandmaster (2013) provides the template here: 
Wong reordered scenes and imported new sequences while adhering to TWC’s demands for 
interposed expository titles and an efficient running time (the American version is 22 minutes 
shorter than the Chinese theatrical release). Virtually unique is the tactic of challenge and 
repudiation. South Korean director Bong Joon-ho controversially adopted this stance over the 
Weinstein-acquired Snowpiercer (2013). TWC had struck a negative pickup deal for the film, 
acquiring distribution rights for six English-speaking territories. Tensions flared when TWC 
sought to trim Bong’s original cut, insert explicative titles, and, according to critic Tony Rayns, 
“turn Snowpiercer into a more conventional action-thriller” (Rayns 2014: 38). Bong refused to 
sanction a TWC compressed cut. Consequently, says Peter Chan, “the film was in jail for six 
months or so” until the Korean director released it in territories not under Weinstein’s 
jurisdiction. Snowpiercer’s success in these markets – as well as a groundswell of public and 
critical sympathy for Bong’s wrangling with the Weinsteins – eventually broke the impasse. 
“The Weinsteins basically lost the battle,” claims Chan. “They had to either give up the movie 
and get a refund of their deposit, or accept the movie as it is, because Bong wasn’t prepared to let 
the film be edited.” In fact, the outcome was less triumph than trade-off. TWC released 
Snowpiercer in the US without cuts, but reneged on its intended wide-scale release in favor of 
limited platform distribution.  
 
In all the above cases, the American distributor’s compulsion to “make over” the Asian movie 
springs from essentialist premises, along with predigested yet contentious axioms about western 
viewers’ impatience with culture-specific content, their intolerance of subtitles, their “ever-
diminishing attention spans” (Dixon: 363), and so forth. [20] Invariably, the makeover functions 
to attenuate the imported film’s eccentricities and complexity. [21] Even Wong Kar-wai acceded 
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to essentialist tenets, reworking The Grandmaster for greater simplicity and clarity. The TWC 
version aims “to clarify [the Chinese version’s] complex historical context,” Wong has said. It 
aims to create a “more straightforward and linear” narrative for the US audience (Steinberg 
2013). Here again an imputed lack of cultural competency among American viewers provides a 
pretext for simplifying the action: “The Grandmaster is very specific,” states Wong. “Because 
(non-Chinese viewers) don’t have much information or knowledge about the background and 
history, you have to give enough information for them to get into the story” (Chang 2013). As in 
Dragon, Wong’s US cut foregrounds martial-arts genre elements, while some domestic scenes 
are curtailed or entirely shorn away. [22] Intelligibility – and genre specification – is a prime 
concern not only for the Weinstein Company but for other US distribution firms too. “The way 
we market these films is very much toward one specific genre,” notes distributor Doris 
Pfardrescher. “With Let the Bullets Fly [2010], we tried to gear it toward one genre in order to 
simplify it.” [23] Thus distributors’ makeover tactics – the amplifying of genre content and 
downgrading of narrative complexity – go hand in glove with priorities of marketing and 
promotion. 
 
Yet some theorists have argued that Chinese-language films rely on transcultural norms of story 
and style, and widespread or universal cognitive and perceptual propensities (see for instance 
Bordwell 1998 and 2001). More anecdotally, Peter Chan avers that “Whenever my films travel, 
the audience responds exactly the same anywhere I go…Yes, sometimes there are cultural 
nuances that people don’t get, and that can make the film a little less fun, but the core of the film 
still translates.” These films’ cultural nuances seldom jeopardize cross-cultural comprehension 
for they are embedded within broader transcultural storytelling norms shared across different 
cultures. Moreover, whereas US distributors seek to simplify narrative, popular trends in 
contemporary cinema indicate that audiences worldwide comprehend and enjoy narrative 
complexity. Puzzle-centered movies have grown prominent in most national cinemas, not least in 
Hong Kong and China where films such as Wu Xia, Mad Detective, 2046 (2004), Infernal Affairs 
(2002), and Hero (2002) are salient titles. Cognitive research supports the hypothesis that 
filmgoers savor adventurous storytelling. Of Hollywood movies, Todd Berliner notes the 
spectator’s pleasurable experience of “insight,” the exhilarating moment at which the solution to 
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the plot’s central enigma is revealed (Berliner 2013: 208). Murray Smith describes the 
“architectural pleasure” elicited by elaborate plotting (Smith 2001: 156), while Ed Tan suggests 
that such plots can stimulate so-called “artefact emotions” triggered by the fiction’s palpable 
construction (Tan 1996: 82). Reworking The Grandmaster into linear form might make the plot 
simpler to process, but it does not automatically make the film aesthetically, cognitively, or 
emotionally more rewarding. 
 
That US distributors treat Asian imports timorously is justifiable, given the mammoth 
expenditure poured into American distribution (which is often greater than the entire production 
budget of an average Hong Kong film). Recondite, offbeat, or innovative films pose an 
especially imposing challenge for distributors. As Chan puts it: “Any foreign film that doesn’t fit 
into a simple A-B-C formula – anything outside the box – is difficult to sell in the US market. 
This is not to say that American audiences can’t understand those films, because a lot of those 
films tell universal stories.” However, to attribute the lack of Chinese-language crossover hits to 
an intrinsic disparity between Chinese and western modes of storytelling is to obscure the 
integral role played by US distributors, whose caution and conservatism hobbles the Chinese 
film’s market value in western territories. Worse, the cultural-difference premise reproduces 
Orientalist notions of Chinese inscrutability, of China as something fundamentally unknowable 
and Other. From here it is but a small step to the notion of the “Chinese threat” and an irrational 
fear of Chinese soft power.  
 
Going Home 
For today’s Hong Kong director, the difference between operating in the PRC and working with 
or within the United States is vanishingly thin. As one critic puts it, “In America power lies with 
the studios; in China with the state” (Anon 2013: 101). For Hong Kong directors migrating to the 
mainland or Hollywood film industry, the film they wish to make (or sell) is radically mediated 
by a host of industrial, economic, and political pressures, as the East-West trajectory of Wu Xia 
illustrates. State censorship, self-censorship, ideational imperatives (e.g. exporting soft power), 
postproduction dubbing, American retitling and re-editing, narrow theatrical release windows – 
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all these mediations assail the transnational Hong Kong filmmaker. Then there is the prolonged 
and labyrinthine bureaucracy, whether studio or state governed; and just as directors in the PRC 
must reckon with Beijing censors, so directors in Hollywood are susceptible to test screenings, 
comment cards, executive memos, and other market-led constraints. Appearances to the contrary, 
perhaps, the filmmaker must also adhere to same moral priorities in both Hollywood and China: 
Manichean dualisms prevail in the films of both industries, and most movies wend toward what 
Noël Carroll calls a “morally correct outcome” (Carroll 1996: 101). “The biggest problem in 
Chinese censorship that cannot be avoided is black and white morality on screen,” states Chan. 
“And it’s exactly the same thing in Hollywood: there are good guys and bad guys, and it’s very 
one-dimensional.” Indeed, Chan regards the two industries as broadly synonymous. “The best 
thing that prepared me for working in China was working in Hollywood,” he notes. 
 
A third option for Chan – to “go home” and embark on localized Hong Kong production – 
proves not only unsustainable given the modest size of the region’s domestic market, but also 
undesirable for a filmmaker pledged to pan-Asian and international film production. The local 
cinema has always relied on overseas markets. Even Hong Kong directors dedicated to 
indigenous production and subject matter have oriented at least some of their output to the 
Greater China and southeast Asia markets – think of Ann Hui (A Simple Life [2011]), Johnnie To 
(Drug War [2013]), and Pang Ho-cheung (Love in the Buff [2012]). Granted, local film 
production harbors advantages. Bureaucratic obstacles are fewer and less byzantine than in 
China and Hollywood, and a ratings system eliminates the challenges of censorship. Wholly 
local ventures forego the principle of the preproduction script – much less the ritual of state or 
studio script approval – as a prerequisite for shooting. But even in Hong Kong few directors 
command the right of final cut, and all must balance artistic choice against market concerns, 
economic boundaries, and mandates from financiers, producers, and distributors. For Peter Chan, 
at least, mainland China constitutes the primary territory in which to make and market movies. 
Whereas the 1990s witnessed an exodus of Hong Kong directors to Hollywood, today the 
situation has changed. Though still craving crossover hits, Hong Kong and China no longer 
needs or covets America – precisely the realization achieved by the protagonists of American 




The bottom line is that, commensurate with China’s rise as an economic power, the US and 
international markets matter less to Hong Kong and PRC filmmakers than they did a decade ago. 
No longer is foreign box office an economic priority. If in the early 2000s overseas revenue 
accounted for roughly 70% of a mainland film’s overall gross, today that figure is closer to 5%, 
most of which comes not from America, Europe, or Japan but from pan-Asian territories (chiefly 
Hong Kong, Taiwan, Singapore, and Malaysia). In this climate, the economic incentive to 
carpenter global crossover movies is low. (Instead, other kinds of incentive – namely, the 
international promotion of Chinese soft power – nourish Beijing’s appetite to foster a global hit 
like Crouching Tiger.) Nor does Hollywood wield the gravitational pull on Chinese filmmakers 
it once did. Its cultural allure, along with the instability of the Hong Kong industry in the early 
1990s, led to a migration of Hong Kong directors in that decade, but now comparable 
opportunities can be found in the mainland – seemingly without the problem of language 
barriers, unfamiliar work routines, cultural alienation, institutional racism, and so on. In Chan’s 
view, “If I have the capacity to work at a fairly smooth level in China, and for other Asian 
directors able to do likewise, why would we want to go to Hollywood and start from scratch in 
an unfamiliar industry, at the bottom of [the Hollywood pecking order]?” 
  
Today, China need not go to Hollywood; now Hollywood comes to China. Hollywood firms 
seeking a foothold in the China market court mainland studios and government agencies, 
lobbying for greater quota access and coproduction deals. Often the Sino-US joint venture 
amounts to what Chan calls “fake coproduction,” i.e. Hollywood movies ramped up by a few 
Chinese actors, and granted large-scale mainland distribution (he cites Iron Man 3 [2013] and 
Transformers 4: Age of Extinction [2014] as examples). Still, Chan predicts that recent trade 
agreements and China’s continued market growth make legitimate Sino-US coproductions 
inevitable in the years to come. If this comes to pass, Beijing may yet achieve genuine crossover 
success, buttressed in the West by the full might of Hollywood’s distribution capabilities (as 
against TWC’s low-key platform and video-on-demand release strategies). A few such megahits 






1. The Close Economic Partnership Arrangement (CEPA), signed in 2003, encompassed a range 
of incentives and provisions designed to integrate the economies of Hong Kong and China. 
2. Jeffery Chan, “The Selling and Branding of Chinese-language Films Internationally,” Filmart 
industry seminar, Hong Kong, 18 March 2013. 
3. Author’s interview with Au Kin-yee, 5 April 2014, Hong Kong. 
4. Author’s interview with Peter Chan, 3 April 2014, Hong Kong. All subsequent quotations 
from, and claims attributed to, Peter Chan derive from this interview. 
5. Several figures lay claim to this phrase’s inception: social historian Gerard Lemos, whose 
book The End of the Chinese Dream appeared in 2012; Party leader Xi Jinping, for whom the 
term became a political mantra in 2013; and Peter Chan himself, whose American Dreams 
dominated mainland theaters in the same year. Regardless of authorship, these coeval 
developments jointly swept the notion of a “Chinese dream” into the mainland public discourse.  
6. The China threat encompasses a range of (western) anxieties concerning China’s economic 
rise as a global superpower, including the country’s increasing investment in and consumption of 
natural resources, its growing military capabilities, the perceived threat to western democratic 
values, and the peril of soft power eroding western (and especially American) supremacy. See 
for further discussion Barr 2011. 
7. Chan’s film here skewers the American assumption that migration to the US benefits the 
migrant, who typically holds an affirmative opinion of American society. “International students 
usually return home with a greater appreciation of American values and institutions,” claims 
Joseph Nye (Nye 2004: 44-45). 
8. The perception of a shift in power within Sino-US relations increasingly finds expression in 
both Chinese and American works of fiction. Asian American playwright David Henry Hwang 
thematizes this issue in his 2012 comedy, Chinglish. In the play’s closing scene, a white 
American businessman reflects on his experiences trading in China: “I think it’s important to 
enter the Chinese market with realistic expectations. I mean, there may have been a time when 
[the Chinese] looked up to us. If so, that was long before I came onto the scene. Nowadays, to be 
successful, you have to understand your place in their picture” (2012: 99). 
9. Precisely what this outlook encompasses, and how it is manifested, typically goes unanalyzed 
by Chan’s commentators. I take these critics to connote more than Chan’s transnational 
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distribution and marketing strategies; rather, I think they mean to suggest a worldview, and a set 
of preoccupations, that are fundamentally different than those possessed by Chan’s compatriots. 
10. According to Well Go USA distributor Doris Pfardrescher, “what primarily do well in the US 
are martial-arts action films – they have a long-standing fanbase, they contain simplified stories 
and an abundance of visual effects, and they’re easy for US viewers to consume” (Bettinson 
2014: 265, emphasis added). This situation has changed little in the past decade. In 2008 Bey 
Logan, vice-president of Asian acquisitions at The Weinstein Company, attested: “The Asian 
films that are working for us in America are stylized action. The martial arts movies are selling, 
but the horror movies aren’t.” Author’s interview with Bey Logan, 27 March 2008, Hong Kong.  
11. Author’s interview with Au Kin-yee, 5 April 2014, Hong Kong. 
12. Peter Chan estimates that Cantonese-dubbed films automatically accrue 40% more revenue 
in Guangdong than Mandarin-language films. 
13. Where logic dictates, exceptions may be found. The explicit subject matter and settings of 
American Dreams, for instance, meant that a Cantonese version would be inappropriate. 
14. This version also exercises an act of politically-correct censorship, deleting a brief moment 
whereby a young child is physically disciplined by his mother. 
15. Compare Wu Xia’s gross of US$ 1,032,857 at the Hong Kong box office. As this example 
indicates, North American distribution poses problems not only of artistic interference but of 
straitened distribution too. Even when the US distributor has assembled a revised cut to their 
satisfaction, the film is granted a highly limited theatrical release. TWC released a reedited 
version of Shaolin Soccer (2002) on no more than fourteen screens at a time during its North 
American exhibition (Dombrowski 2008). Mainland blockbuster Painted Skin: The Resurrection 
(2012) was exhibited in just six US theatres during its 35-day run, and Let the Bullets Fly (2010) 
played in ten US theatres during its 56-day release. Critics often adduce the North American 
box-office failure of Lost in Thailand (2012) as evidence that Chinese films do not travel 
successfully (the film’s US$ 57,000 theatrical gross pales in comparison to its domestic gross of 
US$ 202,000,000). But this film’s North American release was restricted to just eleven days in 
35 theatres, precluding much chance of box office success. 
16. The reworking practices made famous by Weinstein are not unprecedented. A notable 
foregoing example is The Legend of the 7 Golden Vampires (1974), a Shaw Brothers-Hammer 
Film coproduction, whose original American distribution collapsed in 1974. Several years later, 
US distributor Dynamite Entertainment bought the American distribution rights. The firm 
excised twenty minutes from the original version, reedited scenes out of sequence, repeated 
certain scenes, and released the film in America under a different, misnomered title (The Seven 
Brothers Meet Dracula). 
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17. Doris Pfardrescher, “The Selling and Branding of Chinese-language Films Internationally,” 
Filmart industry seminar, Hong Kong, 18 March 2013.  
18. Jeffery Chan, “The Selling and Branding of Chinese-language Films Internationally,” Filmart 
industry seminar, Hong Kong, 18 March 2013. 
19. Patrick Frater, “The Selling and Branding of Chinese-language Films Internationally,” 
Filmart industry seminar, Hong Kong, 18 March 2013. 
20. At times, a confused logic accompanies the distributor’s practice. If American viewers won’t 
sit still for subtitles, why suppose they will welcome newly-added intertitles? Moreover, Western 
viewers were apparently untroubled by subtitled screenings of Hero, Infernal Affairs, Crouching 
Tiger, and other successful Chinese-language imports. Accounting for the failure of Chinese 
comedies in the US, one critic echoes a widely-held assumption that “people going to the theater 
to laugh don’t want to read subtitles” (Huntsman 2014: 35). But there are ample 
counterexamples, such as Kung Fu Hustle (2004), that suggest that the import’s problems lie 
elsewhere than in Americans’ allergy to subtitles. 
21. For example, a Tarantino-esque rock-guitar cue italicizes a major plot revelation in Wu Xia, 
but Dragon eliminates this incongruous riff in favor of an unemphatic and prosaic orchestral cue. 
22. The Weinstein Company’s DVD release of The Grandmaster features additional material the 
nature of which makes clear the import’s target demographic – namely, western devotees and 
practitioners of martial arts, rather than the art-film or ‘world cinema’ cognoscenti that is 
Wong’s typical audience. The supplementary DVD material includes interviews with Bruce 
Lee’s daughter and Wu-Tang Clan producer RZA. 
23. Pfardrescher, “The Selling and Branding of Chinese-language Films Internationally,” Filmart 
industry seminar, Hong Kong, 18 March 2013. 
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